

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMW-9488
TO	Chief of Base, Munich Attention: Liaison Branch	SECRET DESENSITIZED	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
INFO	Chief of Station, Germany Chief of Base, Berlin		
FROM	Chief, EE		DATE 28 JUL 1960
SUBJECT	DIZTAG/UPHILL/Operations Jaroslav ANTOS		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
			MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	Paragraphs 4 and 5		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)	A. EGMA-49595, dated 7 June 1960 B. DIR-35986, dated 21 June 1960 C. BRIN-9821, dated 23 June 1960 D. MUNI-0995, dated 8 July 1960		
1. Reference A forwarded a report on UPHILL's double agent case against Jaroslav ANTOS. Paragraph 6 outlined UPHILL's suggestion that a plan be laid to arrest ANTOS in West Berlin and also contained UPHILL's query whether KUBARK would be willing to assist or cooperate in this proposed action. 2. References B and C provided a clear indication of KUBARK interest in the UPHILL plan and suggested that, if more complete information were furnished and several questions resolved, KUBARK would be willing to support and facilitate an effort to arrest ANTOS. 3. We were, therefore, puzzled by receipt of Reference D, which stated that UPHILL's thinking has not yet developed to the stage where the CE shop has consulted the political section, which is a step prior to any firm planning for executive action. 4. Inasmuch as ANTOS has scheduled future meetings with @GRAMM, and will presumably continue to drive the agent to West Berlin after the meetings, and particularly since the case now appears to have even less long-range viability than before, it is Headquarters' view that there now is more, rather than less, reason for UPHILL to consider executive action against ANTOS and we would greatly appreciate a fuller explanation of UPHILL's position and views on this case. We feel that this explanation would be beneficial not only from the standpoint of clarifying the @GRAMM case, but from the broader vantage point of determining UPHILL's interest, motives, capabilities and intentions in this and possible future cases of a similar nature. 5. We suggest that in addition to outstanding questions included in References B and C, UPHILL's comments be solicited on the following: a. Paragraph 6 of Reference A states that UPHILL suggested that a plan be laid to arrest ANTOS in West Berlin. This clearly implies that some responsible authority in UPHILL had sanctioned this proposal. Reference D, which forwarded the UPHILL explanation that the CE shop had not yet conferred with the political section, strikes us either as an excuse for withdrawing the proposal, or else an admission that the plan was merely an off-the-cuff thought by one or two UPHILLers. We are, of course, prepared to consider and if possible render assistance to UPHILL proposals for operational activity of this type, but in view of the considerable time spent at Headquarters in discussing and obtaining approval of several components for KUBARK to participate, we feel that before a proposal of this type is submitted, it should be clearly spelled out whether such a plan is a preliminary suggestion by an UPHILL desk officer, or a proposal which UPHILL has approved or at least staffed out to the extent that final approval is a strong possibility. b. Notwithstanding the confusion on UPHILL's position, we are still interested in the possibility of taking action against ANTOS. On the			
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basis of Reference D, it seems to us that the situation has not materially changed so far as the merits and possibility of apprehending ANTOS are concerned. The fact that he did not drive the agent to Tempelhof may complicate our planning, but since he still entered West Berlin with the agent, it would appear that the CIS does not necessarily mistrust @GRAMM more than previously. Basically we believe that if we decide to attempt to apprehend ANTOS, the necessary groundwork should be laid and the arrest warrant obtained. If it then proves physically impossible to locate ANTOS and @GRAMM together in West Berlin, we obviously will not be able to carry out the arrest. However, there are numerous possibilities of apprehending ANTOS with @GRAMM in West Berlin besides waiting for him at the Tempelhof airfield (a stake-out of the most commonly used sector crossing points at times when ANTOS is expected to drive @GRAMM to West Berlin is one possibility), and we do not believe that the fact that ANTOS changed the area where he deposits @GRAMM in West Berlin should be cause for dropping all efforts to apprehend ANTOS. 26 July 1960 Distributions: ✓ 2 - MOB 2 - COS/G 2 - BOB		
FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET DESENSITIZED
		☐ CONTINUED PAGE NO. 2

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. ECM-9188
TO INFO	Chief of Base, Munich Attention: Liaison Branch Chief of Station, Germany Chief of Base, Berlin		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. ()
FROM	Chief, SE	DATE 28 JUL 1960	
SUBJECT	DIZTAR/UPHILL/Operations Jaroslav ANTOS	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) ☐ MARKED FOR INDEXING ☒ NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
ACTION REQUIRED	Paragraphs 4 and 5	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY	
REFERENCE(S) A. ECPA-49595, dated 7 June 1960 B. DTR-35986, dated 21 June 1960 C. BRIN-9821, dated 23 June 1960 D. HPMI-0995, dated 8 July 1960 1. Reference A forwarded a report on UPHILL's double agent case against Jaroslav ANTOS. Paragraph 6 outlined UPHILL's suggestion that a plan be laid to arrest ANTOS in West Berlin and also contained UPHILL's query whether KUBARK would be willing to assist or cooperate in this proposed action. 2. References B and C provided a clear indication of KUBARK interest in the UPHILL plan and suggested that, if more complete information were furnished and several questions resolved, KUBARK would be willing to support and facilitate an effort to arrest ANTOS. 3. We were, therefore, puzzled by receipt of Reference D, which stated that UPHILL's thinking has not yet developed to the stage where the CE shop has consulted the political section, which is a step prior to any firm planning for executive action. 4. Inasmuch as ANTOS has scheduled future meetings with GURAM, and will presumably continue to drive the agent to West Berlin after the meetings, and particularly since the case now appears to have even less long-range viability than before, it is Headquarters' view that there now is more, rather than less, reason for UPHILL to consider executive action against ANTOS and we would greatly appreciate a fuller explanation of UPHILL's position and views on this case. We feel that this explanation would be beneficial not only from the standpoint of clarifying the GURAM case, but from the broader vantage point of determining UPHILL's interest, motives, capabilities and intentions in this and possible future cases of a similar nature. 5. We suggest that in addition to outstanding questions included in References B and C, UPHILL's comments be solicited on the following: a. Paragraph 6 of Reference A states that UPHILL suggested that a plan be laid to arrest ANTOS in West Berlin. This clearly implies that some responsible authority in UPHILL had sanctioned this proposal. Reference D, which forwarded the UPHILL explanation that the CE shop had not yet conferred with the political section, strikes us either as an excuse for withdrawing the proposal, or else an admission that the plan was merely an off-the-cuff thought by one or two UPHILLers. We are, of course, prepared to consider and if possible render assistance to UPHILL proposals for operational activity of this type, but in view of the considerable time spent at Headquarters in discussing and obtaining approval of several components for KUBARK to participate, we feel that before a proposal of this type is submitted, it should be clearly spelled out whether such a plan is a preliminary suggestion by an UPHILL desk officer, or a proposal which UPHILL has approved or at least staffed out to the extent that final approval is a strong possibility. b. Notwithstanding the confusion on UPHILL's position, we are still interested in the possibility of taking action against ANTOS.			
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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. SECRET-0000
DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43 basis of Reference D, it seems to us that the situation has not materially changed so far as the merits and possibility of apprehending ANTOS are concerned. The fact that he did not deliver the agent to Tempelhof may complicate our planning, but since he still entered West Berlin with the agent, it would appear that the GIB does not necessarily distrust SCHMIDT more than previously. Basically we believe that if we decide to attempt to apprehend ANTOS, the necessary groundwork should be laid and the arrest warrant obtained. If it then proves physically impossible to locate ANTOS and SCHMIDT together in West Berlin, we obviously will not be able to carry out the arrest. However, there are numerous possibilities of apprehending ANTOS with SCHMIDT in West Berlin besides waiting for him at the Tempelhof airfield (a stake-out of the most commonly used sector crossing points at times when ANTOS is expected to drive SCHMIDT to West Berlin is one possibility), and we do not believe that the fact that ANTOS changed the area where he deposits SCHMIDT in West Berlin should be cause for dropping all efforts to apprehend ANTOS. () 26 July 1960 Distributions: 2 - MOB 2 - COS/3 2 - ECH 1 - RI () 1 - EE/C Chrono EE/C/WF:das DESENSITIZED per CSN 43-43		
FORM 10-57 53a (40)	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS 51-28, 51-28A AND 51-29 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET ☐ CONTINUED PAGE NO. 2

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